shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet

Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 144 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting). Yet, under the State's plan, they still constitute a voting majority in 10 (or 83%) of the 12 congressional districts. The Attorney General's interposition of a 5 objection "properly is viewed" as "an administrative finding of discrimination" against a racial minority. It does so by glossing over the striking similarities, focusing on surface differences, most notably the (admittedly unusual) shape of the newly created district, and imagining an entirely new cause of action. Shortly after the complaint in Pope v. Blue was filed, appellants instituted the present action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Jewish Congress by Marc D. Stern and Lois C. Waldman; for the Republican National Committee by Benjamin L. Ginsberg and Michael A. Hess; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. 3 Although Davis involved political groups, the principles were expressly drawn from the Court's racial gerrymandering cases. H. Jefferson Powell argued the cause for state appellees. Laws, ch. and by him referred to the Court in No. Thus. In an opinion which explored the nature of "political questions" and the appropriateness of Court action in them, the Court held that there were no such questions to be answered in this case and that legislative apportionment was a justiciable issue. Of the following two options-creation of two minority influence districts or of a single majority-minority district-is one "narrowly tailored" and the other not? A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. What appellants object to is redistricting legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification. Location North Carolina General Assembly. These arguments were not developed below, and the issues remain open for consideration on remand. A reapportionment statute typically does not classify persons at all; it classifies tracts of land, or addresses. Redistricters have to justify themselves. The majority first took judicial notice of a fact omitted from appellants' complaint: that appellants are white. Croson, supra, at 500 (quoting Wygant, supra, at 277 (plurality opinion)). The difficulty of proof, of course, does not mean that a racial gerrymander, once established, should receive less scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause than other state legislation classifying citizens by race. Laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of that prohibition. To begin with, the complaint nowhere alleges any type of stigmatic harm. See Reynolds, 377 U. S., at 578 (recognizing these as legitimate state interests). T(t)=37.29+0.46cos[12(t16.37)]. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act forbids districting plans that will have a discriminatory effect on minority groups. ), or that such had been the State's intent, see id., at 179-180 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in judgment). As Wright demonstrates, when members of a racial group live together in one community, a reapportionment plan that concentrates members of the group in one district and excludes them from others may reflect wholly legitimate purposes. And those three Justices specifically concluded that race-based districting, as a response to racially polarized voting, is constitutionally permissible only when the State "employ[s] sound districting principles," and only when the affected racial group's "residential patterns afford the opportunity of creating districts in which they will be in the majority." More generally, we remarked: "The mere fact that one interest group or another concerned with the outcome of [the district's] elections has found itself outvoted and without legislative seats of its. " In Shaw v. Reno (1993), the Court ruled that electoral districts whose boundaries cannot be explained except on the basis of race can be challenged as potential violations of the equal protection clause, and in Miller v. Johnson (1995) it held that the equal protection clause Read More opinion of O'Connor In Sandra Day O'Connor Constitutional Law for a Changing America Resource Center, 13. to Juris. Pp. 3. A. Croson Co., supra, at 493; see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 484 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C. Nor, because of the distinctions between the two categories, is there any risk that Fourteenth Amendment districting law as such will be taken to imply anything for purposes of general Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny about "benign" racial discrimination, or about group entitlement as distinct from individual protection, or about the appropriateness of strict or other heightened scrutiny. JUSTICE SOUTER contends that exacting scrutiny of racial gerrymanders under the Fourteenth Amendment is inappropriate because reapportionment "nearly always require[s] some consideration of race for legitimate reasons." Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for federal appellees. Today we hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 755 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("One need not use Justice Stewart's classic definition of obscenity-'I know it when I see it' -as an ultimate standard for judging the constitutionality of a gerrymander to recognize that dramatically irregular shapes may have sufficient probative force to call for an explanation" (footnotes omitted)). Ante, at 658. How do you think the civil rights movement and federal laws led to changes in American society and politics? In this case, however, we know what the legislators' purpose was: The North Carolina Legislature drew District 12 to include a majority of African-American voters. The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent. As a majority of the Justices construed the complaint, the UJO plaintiffs made a different claim: that the New York plan impermissibly "diluted" their voting strength. The Court appears to accept this, and it does not purport to disturb the law of vote dilution in any way. See 808 F. 1300 (1966). As stated above, five Justices were of the view that, absent any contention that the proposed plan was adopted with the intent, or had the effect, of unduly minimizing the white majority's voting strength, the Fourteenth Amendment was not implicated. App. They contend that the State's black population is too dispersed to support two geographically compact majority-black districts, as the bi-. (emphasis added). Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 (1977). Shaw V. Reno Civil Liberties vs Civil Rights 17th Amendment 2nd Amendment 3rd Amendment 4th Amendment Bostock v Clayton County District of Columbia v. Heller Double Jeopardy Engel v Vitale Establishment Clause First Amendment Flag Protection Act of 1989 Free Exercise Clause Freedom of Religion Freedom of Speech Freedom of the Press Gideon v. A consequence of this categorical approach is the absence of any need for further searching "scrutiny" once it has been shown that a given districting decision has a purpose and effect falling within one of those categories. 364 U. S., at 341. 1973). See, e. g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. UJO concerned New York's revision of a reapportionment plan to include additional majority-minority districts in response to the Attorney General's denial of administrative preclearance under 5. See Fed. 91-2038, p. 43a (Complaint in Pope v. Blue, No. The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is equally pernicious. Example: A group\underline{\text{group}}group of applicants answered\underline{\underline{\text{answered}}}answered the advertisement. Not so, apparently, when the districting "segregates" by drawing odd-shaped lines.7 In that case, we are told, such proof no longer is needed. North Carolina's decision to create a majority-minority district can be explained as an attempt to meet this objection. The case established that any legislative redistricting must be strictly scrutinized and that any laws related to racially motivated redistricting must be held to narrow standards and It was 160 miles long and generally corresponded to the Interstate 85 corridor. 16-19. (equating various articulations of standards of review "more stringent" than "'reasonableness'" with "strict scrutiny"). Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 758 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring). the democratic ideal, it should find no footing here." Wright illustrates the difficulty of determining from the face of a single-member districting plan that it purposefully distinguishes between voters on the basis of race. To allow judicial interference whenever this occurs would be to invite constant and unmanageable intrusion. We have considered the constitutionality of these practices in other Fourteenth Amendment cases and have required plaintiffs to demonstrate that the challenged practice has the purpose and effect of diluting a racial group's voting strength. The Court today chooses not to overrule, but rather to sidestep, UJO. Appellants sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the state appellees. Under our cases there is in general a requirement that in order to obtain relief under the Fourteenth Amendment, the purpose and effect of the districting must be to devalue the effectiveness of a voter compared to what, as a group member, he would otherwise be able to enjoy. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. to Juris. We note, however, that only three Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc voting apart from the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. But as JUSTICE WHITE points out, see ante, at 672 (dissenting opinion), and as the Court acknowledges, see ante, at 647, we have held that such principles are not constitutionally required, with the consequence that their absence cannot justify the distinct constitutional regime put in place by the Court today. We said as much in Gaffney: "[C]ourts have [no] constitutional warrant to invalidate a state plan, otherwise within tolerable population limits, because it undertakes, not to minimize or eliminate the political strength of any group or party, but to recognize it and, through districting, provide a rough sort of proportional representation in the legislative halls of the State." If not, it does not. on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification." shape of the district lines could "be explained only in racial terms." See, e. g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339,341. At issue in Wright were four districts contained in a New York apportionment statute. 7, that included a second majority-black district. The second type of unconstitutional practice is that which "affects the political strength of various groups," Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 83 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment), in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. I respectfully dissent. The three-judge District Court granted the federal appellees' motion to dismiss. of Ed. A reapportionment plan would not be narrowly tailored to the goal of avoiding retrogression if the State went beyond what was reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression. See App. UJO, supra, at 150. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 161-162 (1977) (UJO) (pluralityopinion of WHITE, J., joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ. There is no independent constitutional requirement of compactness or contiguity, and the Court's opinion (despite its many references to the shape of District 12, see ante, at 635-636, 641, 642, 644-648) does not suggest otherwise. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 153-155 (1971). Id., at 56 (internal quotation marks omitted); id., at 58 (Harlan, J., concurring); id., at 59-62 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Our focus is on appellants' claim that the State engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. The majority's contrary view is perplexing in light of its concession that "compactness or attractiveness has never been held to constitute an independent federal constitutional requirement for state legislative districts." Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.(1977). In providing the reasons for the objection, the Attorney General noted that "[f]or the south-central to southeast area, there were several plans drawn providing for a second majority-minority congressional district" and that such a district would have been no more irregular than others in the State's plan. I add these comments to emphasize that the two critical facts in this case are undisputed: First, the shape of District 12 is so bizarre that it must have been drawn for the purpose of either advantaging or disadvantaging a cognizable group of voters; and, second, regardless of that shape, it was drawn for the purpose of facilitating the election of a second black representative from North Carolina. 92-357 Argued: April 20, 1993 Decided: June 28, 1993. facilitating the election of a member of an identifiable group of voters? Carr (1962) was a landmark case concerning re-apportionment and redistricting. In light of this background, it strains credulity to suggest that North Carolina's purpose in creating a second majorityminority district was to discriminate against members of the majority group by "impair[ing] or burden[ing their] opportunity to participate in the political process." To comply with 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965-which prohibits a covered jurisdiction from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without federal authorizationNorth Carolina submitted to the Attorney General a congressional reapportionment plan with one majority-black district. Statement 102a. The group claimed that the districts were racial gerrymanders that violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It spite of such criticisms, the redistricting accomplished its goal. Nonetheless, in those cases where this cause of action is sufficiently pleaded, the State will have to justify its decision to consider race as being required by a compelling state interest, and its use of race as narrowly tailored to that interest. As we have said, "it requires no special genius to recognize the political consequences of drawing a district line along one street rather than another." Regardless whether that description was accurate, see ante, at 645, it seriously deflates the precedential value which the majority seeks to ascribe to Gomillion: As I see it, the case cannot stand for the proposition that the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more, gives rise to an equal protection challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment. Before us, the state appellees contend that the General Assembly's revised plan was necessary not to prevent retrogression, but to avoid dilution of black voting strength in violation of 2, as construed in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986). Not very long ago, of course, it was argued that minority groups defined by race were the only groups the Equal Protection Clause protected in this context. Shaw v. Reno is an important decision because it represents a conservative shift on the Court. With him on the briefs was Jeffrey B. Parsons. Shaw's group claimed that drawing districts based on race violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of that prohibition. Classifications of citizens on the basis of race "are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." that the white voters who brought the suit could not prove they had been injured in any way by the redistricting plan, and second, that the redistricting plan was an attempt to equalize treatment by providing minority voters with an effective voice in the political process, not an attempt to strip voting power from a particular group. There is no support for this distinction in UJO, and no authority in the cases relied on by the Court either. Significant changes in the area of redistricting and gerrymandering, 1. The duty to govern impartially is abused when a group with power over the electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political strength at the expense of any weaker group. Whites constitute roughly 76% of the total population and 79% of the voting age population in North Carolina. The dissenters thought the unusual. The Court reasoned: "If these allegations upon a trial remained uncontradicted or unqualified, the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote." After the Attorney General of the United States objected to the plan pursuant to 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. As Justice Douglas explained in his dissent inWright v. Rockefellernearly 30 years ago: "Here the individual is important, not his race, his creed, or his color. See post, at 678 (dissenting opinion). Appellants maintain that the General Assembly's revised plan could not have been required by 2. One state legislator has remarked that" '[i]f you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district.'" As we have held, one's constitutional rights are not violated merely because the candidate one supports loses the election or because a group (including a racial group) to which one belongs winds up with a representative from outside that group. fications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics." The District Court below relied on these portions of UJO to reject appellants' claim. Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers. Oral Argument - April 20, 1993; Opinions. Five of the eight Justices who participated in the decision resolved the case under the framework the Court previously had adopted for vote-dilution cases. Finally, like New York, North Carolina reacted by modifying its plan and creating additional majority-minority districts. A covered jurisdiction's interest in creating majority-minority districts in order to comply with the nonretrogression rule under 5 of the Voting Rights Act does not give it carte blanche to engage in racial gerrymandering. As the majority recognizes, "redistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors." Ante, at 652. Docket no. Rather, the issue is whether the classification based on race discriminates. Accordingly, the Court held that such schemes violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they are adopted with a discriminatory purpose and have the effect of diluting minority voting strength. The United States Supreme Court ruled that federal courts could hear and rule on cases in which plaintiffs allege that re-apportionment plans violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . An attorney on behalf of North Carolina argued that the general assembly had created the second district in an attempt to better comply with requests from the Attorney General in accordance with the Voting Rights Act. In this case, the Attorney General suggested that North Carolina could have created a reasonably compact second majority-minority district in the south-central to southeastern part of the State. In my view there is no justification for the Court's determination to depart from our prior decisions by carving out this narrow group of cases for strict scrutiny in place of the review customarily applied in cases dealing with discrimination in electoral districting on the basis of race. Developed below, and no authority in the cases relied on these portions of to! 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